

淡江大學八十七學年度博士班入學考試試題

系列：美國研究所 科目：美國政治及政府

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ARTICLE TO BE USED TO ANSWER PART I:

IT HAS TAKEN 10 BOMBS, DETONATED IN THE DESERTS OF South Asia, to explode a central myth about the world in which we live: that through an elaborate set of international treaties and laws, the acquisition, testing, proliferation and, eventually, even possession of nuclear weapons were on the wane. After all, we were told, a resounding 168 countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Nonproliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely, it was repeatedly pointed out. Keep racking up countries on these lists, the experts said, and we will have a safe world. Then the governments of India and Pakistan, undeterred by all this paperwork, set off their weapons.

Now the United States must devise a policy to confront the new world of nuclear proliferation—a policy based not on comforting myths but on geopolitical realities.

International treaties usually reflect reality rather than shaping it. For the past 50 years, the real engine behind nonproliferation was the cold war. During their global struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union had at least one goal in common: maintaining their nuclear preponderance. To reduce the instability brought about by new nuclear challengers, they promised protection to some countries and threatened punishment to others. It worked; despite access to high technology, many countries chose not to "go nuclear." The treaties dealt awkwardly with the exceptions. The great powers that went public—Britain, France and China—were smuggled into the nuclear club. Others—India, Pakistan and Israel—were simply not discussed much. The dirty little secret of nonproliferation was that many of the countries most likely to want nuclear weapons actually had them.

Now the desert explosions have destroyed the façade of nonproliferation, revealing a new world in which the old guarantees and threats of the cold war no longer work. Depressingly, the one country that does not seem to have recognized this is the United States. Washington still clings to the legal trappings of its nonproliferation policy. Both Congress and the Clinton administration have taken an essentially juridical approach to India and Pakistan's tests. Testing is illegal under international treaties (though neither country had signed the relevant accords); they tested, so they must be punished. Washington has clamped economic sanctions on India and Pakistan and asked them to renounce their weapons programs forthwith. Of course, there is no prospect of either country casting aside programs built up over decades. So American policy is exposed for what it is—a futile attempt to wish away reality. Under international law, all states are alike. In the real world, they are not. India, Pakistan and Israel are very different from Iraq, Iran and Libya. The former are countries with stable, legitimate regimes and reasonable security concerns. The Indians face a Chinese Army three times larger than their own, the Pakistanis in turn are threatened by India's might and Israel faces an array of Arab

countries that have repeatedly tried to destroy it. Nuclear weapons may not be their best deterrent, but it's understandable why they would want them. After all, NATO kept nuclear weapons in Europe to offset the Soviet Union's conventional superiority.

If it wants to stabilize this new world, America must stop playing the judge and become a politician. It must tailor different policies for these two groups of states. With the rogue states the United States should do more than international law requires, aggressively using its power and diplomacy to deny them access to technology and funds for weapons of mass destruction. With countries like India, Pakistan and Israel it should do less, ignoring

leather-bound protocols and accepting their nuclear status. Finally, America must maintain a healthy nuclear arsenal itself. Germany, Japan and others have not worried about their own security because they are protected—explicitly or implicitly—by the American nuclear umbrella. Were the strength and resolve of the American deterrent to fade, these states would surely start taking care of themselves. Ironically, American nuclear disarmament could well result in global nuclear proliferation.

For the crisis at hand, a simple deal is possible. Washington and the other nuclear powers could ask India and Pakistan to sign the various treaties, particularly the Test Ban and the proposed fissile-materials ban—but as declared nuclear-weapon states. In return, all sanctions against them should be lifted. More important, Washington should begin a series of discussions

with their governments aimed at establishing secure command-and-control operations and other such safeguards. The real danger of a nuclear exchange on the Subcontinent lies not so much in an authorized exchange of missiles—each country is deterred from this by the other's arsenal—as in an unauthorized or accidental launch. The United States has an impressive body of technological and operational know-how, developed during the cold war, and could help both countries stabilize their arsenals.

This is not a best-case scenario. A nuclear-arms race on the Indian Subcontinent would be expensive and nerve-racking. Recall the high tension, chills and near misses that filled the first two decades of the U.S.-Soviet arms race—the Cuban missile crisis, the crises in Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Strait. It is, however, the only scenario that is based on what has happened in the last three weeks. In fact, it's quite likely the United States will face a similar dilemma in another part of the globe. Like France and China and Pakistan before them, rising powers in troubled areas might well feel they need to develop the ultimate military insurance policy, a nuclear deterrent. The United States has two options. It can rail against the waves like King Canute and seek to turn back the tide. Or it can accept the new world and try to make it more secure. It is time to point out to all those who still hope to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle that genies in bottles only exist in fairy tales.

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Part I: Comprehension and Writing Skills (a total of 50 pts.)

INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions in this section, Part I, are based on the article shown on the previous page. Read the article carefully and then answer each question. In your own words construct your answers using good English. As this is also a test to evaluate your writing skills, such as proper syntax and grammar usage, please try to avoid verbatim copying of sentences and/or phrases from the article. Also, while it may be difficult in some areas, please do your best to avoid any unnecessary repetition of facts and ideas in your answers. In other words, don't "put all your eggs into one basket" or all your efforts into one question. Therefore, it is strongly suggested that you read through all of the questions before you begin to answer them.

- A) A crucial difference between myth and reality constitutes the essence of the author's theme. Explain exactly what it is he is talking about. Be sure to explain the fundamental features of what he regards as myth and reality. (10 pts.)
- B) What common goal was shared equally by the superpowers during the Cold War? Why? (10 pts.)
- C) Which country, according to the author, today seems to have the most trouble grasping the basic features of contemporary geopolitics? Why? (10 pts.)
- D) The author suggests that an ironic and counterproductive situation could easily develop if the U.S. unilaterally undergoes nuclear disarmament. Why? Explain what he means. (10 pts.)
- E) What, exactly, does the author recommend the U.S. do in the immediate future to counter the dilemma it faces? (10 pts.)

Part II: Composition and Writing Skills (50 pts.)

INSTRUCTIONS: Please write a well-developed, logical, and integrated essay in response to the following questions. In other words, read all of the questions first and then incorporate your responses into a single, well-developed essay.

What is the basic difference, if any, between political elections in America and Taiwan? What essential role do political elections play in both "democratic" systems? To what extent is the electoral process in each respective society, America & Taiwan, influenced by its own philosophical and cultural heritage?

****NOTE:** Your two-page exam questions must be returned with your answers!!!